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INTRODUCTION
In this thesis I intend to investigate the essential, factors in 
the widely influential philosophical position of Alfred J. Ayer. These 
factors are five in number; first, the rejection of metaphysics; second, 
the nature of sense-data; third, the dimensions of language; fourth, the 
doctrine of incorrigible propositions; and finally, the aim and method 
of philosophical enquiry. Tfllhile each of these factors will be treated 
separately, each will, at the same time, be so handled as to bring out 
its integral place in a complete philosophical system.
These factors will be discussed from a purely doctrinal point of 
view for the purpose of arriving at a clear presentation and understand­
ing of Ayer's own position. To achieve this there will be no evaluation 
of his philosophical position in the light of any other philosophy. The 
historical evidence required first, to locate Ayer among his contemporar­
ies, and secondly, to show the ultimate sources of his philosophical 
position, will be restricted to this introduction.
Alfred Ayer is a contemporary British philosopher who is presently 
Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, 
London, His philosophic thought is based on one of the more recent move­
ments within the school of empiricism, namely logical positivism. *
Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (London: Victor 
Gollancz Ltd., 195k, p.31
iv
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2
Logical positivism originated with the Vienna Circle. The Circle was made 
up of a group of philosophers and mathematicians of the empiricist tradition 
who in 1922 began to meet regularly in Vienna for the purpose of discussing 
such problems as the function of philosophy in the analysis of the proposi­
tions of science. It grew into a definite movement within the decade and 
spread rapidly to universities on the Continent, to Oxford and Cambridge in 
the United Kingdom, and to universities in the United States. As a move­
ment the Vienna Circle was very short-lived, but its ideas and their event­
ual penetration into diverse walks of life live on today through such men a3 
Ayer with a more widespread influence and popularity than ever before.
Ayer contacted logical positivism as a young man at Oxford. His not­
able contribution to the movement has been through his writings in which, to 
use the words of J. H. Paton, "he exposed the nature of logical positivism, 
. . .  in all its naked horror, and he did so with a plausibility worthy of 
John Stuart Mil at his best." ^ Its "naked horror" alludes, not so much 
to what Ayer says, but to what, as a consequence of his doctrine, he con­
tends cannot so much as be said at all. The thesis of logical positivism 
is that a properly clarified language may validly express only empirical 
knowledge, thus invalidating all statements of a supra-empirical character, 
be they ethical, metaphysical, or supernatural.
 ^Alfred J. Ayer, "The Vienna Circle", The Revolution in Philosophy, 
(Londons MacMillan & Co., 1956), p.72
3
Ibid., p.72
1+
H. J. Paton, Contemporary British Philosophy, vol.Ill, as quoted 
by Jas. Collins, "Annual Review of Philosophy", Cross Currents, Vol.VII, 
No.l, Winter, 1957, p.86
v
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Ayer's philosophical background can be very simply traced, He him­
self tells us that, while he is in closest agreement with the Vienna Circle, 
his views "derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, 
which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and 
Hume."'’ As to the Russell influence, Ayer agrees with him on some points 
and takes issue with him on others. For instance, Russell was the first to 
introduce the "sense-data theory" to which Ayer subscribes in principle. On 
the other hand, Ayer takes strong exception to Russell's "theory of resem­
blance". A further point of difference is that he does not make use of 
Russell's mathematical logic for philosophical analysis. Russell's influ­
ence is not as fundamental a one as that of George Berkeley and David Hume, 
particularly the latter.
Just as experience was the measure of all knowledge and belief for 
Hume,^ so it is for Ayer. The division of perceptions into "impressions" 
and "ideas" in Hume's doctrine called for his division of propositions into 
those concerning "matters of fact" and those concerning "relations of ideas" 
according to Ayer's interpretation. With respect to the propositions, Ayer 
made a similar division. The "relation of ideas" propositions for Ayer com­
prise the "a priori" propositions of formal logic and mathematics. The "mat-
7
ters of fact" propositions comprise propositions of empirical facts. The
"a priori" propositions are analytical, while the latter are synthetic ac-
_
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.31
^ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (London & Toronto: J. M.
Dent & Sons Ltd., & New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1930), Introduction, p.5
7
' Ayer, Language, Truth end Logic, p.31
vi
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Q
cording to the Kantian division which Ayer adopts in part.
Although Ayer retains the same division of propositions which he
ascribes to Hume he does not retain the Humean elements of cognition in
9
the pattern Hume does. For Ayer "impressions" alone are sense-experience, 
whereas "ideas" are not perceptions at all, as they are for Hume. In Ayer's 
doctrine "ideas" are non-existent. This latter interpretation of "ideas" 
is due to a combined influence of two strange bed-fellows, Berkeley and 
Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein's influence was linguistic. His thesis was that 
philosophical analysis was nothing other than an analysis of the relation 
of language to experience. This notion was a guiding principle in Ayer's 
formation. As to Berkeley, Ayer claims that the former correctly discover­
ed that material things must be definable in terms of sense-contents, or
10
sense-data, and not the other way around as Locke would have it.
Berkeley maintained against Locke that material things were constituted out 
of sense-contents, ^  and not sense-contents out of material things. The 
Berkeleyan principle that esse est percipi does not apply to the perception 
of material things, as Ayer understands it, but does apply to the percep-
8 Ibid., p.78
^ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Pt.I, Vol.I, sec.l, p.11
10 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.$3
11
George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Co., 1887), chap.3, sec.86-91, 
pp.2hl-2U?
vii
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tion of sense-data in as much as it is only of a sense-datum that we can 
12
be directly aware. What this means to a logical positivist is that
material things do not exist at all. While Ayer agrees with Berkeley’s
criticism of Locke, he does not accept Berkeley's account of the way in
which material things are constituted out of sense-contents. He finds his
solution through the Wittgenstein principle, having rejected Berkeley's on
13the grounds that it is idealistic.
Ayer's acute appraisal of the inconsistencies spotted in the doc­
trine of other empiricists and the independent conclusions he arrives at, 
as a result of his consistent logic, brings out his original thought. A 
positive instance of Ayer's originality is his own solution to the problem 
of the substantival ego which has been a perplexing one to the empiricists 
from Locke down. Even Hume, the prototype of wholehearted empiricists,
1U
despaired of the answer. As we shall see, Ayer's solution is decidedly 
different from all others and he feels that his doctrine bridges the
15Humean dilemma of a mind connecting distinct existences.
My reasons for selecting Ayer as the subject of this thesis were 
based on the evident leadership he has and is exercising in the contempor­
ary schools and journals of philosophy. The inpact of Ayer's logical
*1 O
Alfred J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge,
(London: MacMillan & Co., 19U7), Pp. 66-78
^  Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.lU2
^  Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Vol.II, Appendix, p.317
^  Alfred J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, (London: MacMillan 
& Co., 19$6) p.225
viii
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positivism is so pronounced today in university circles that Gustav 
Bergmann asserts that "A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, (London,
1936) and The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, (London, I9I4.O) have 
almost the status of textbooks." ^  In his Contemporary Philosophy, 
Frederick Copies ton, S.J. remarks that Ayer's writings have exercised a 
widespread influence, especially among university students. He observes 
that his clear style has been responsible for what he calls the "positi­
vist mentality”. He contends this "positivist mentality" is "far more 
widespread than the positivist philosophy considered as a system of 
thought. It seems, then, true to say that the neopositivism of the Vienna
Circle was infused into the analytic movement . . . largely through the
17influence of Professor Ayer . . . "
Aside from the influence of his books, Ayer's philosophical 
positions are constantly the subject of numerous articles in the contempo­
rary journals of philosophy. This is an indication of his prominence 
among philosophers. For example, over the past ten years sixty-seven art­
icles have appeared on logical positivism and philosophical analysis in
the important quarterly Philosophical Review, over half of which show 
18Ayer's influence. In the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Ayer's influence is notable in almost all of the twenty-five articles deal-
Gustav Bergmann, The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, (London: 
Longman's, Green and Co., 195U), p.3
17 Frederick Coplesbon, S.J., Contemporary Philosophy, (Westminster, 
Maryland: The Newman Press, 195>6), P»9
18 Philosophical Review, Vols. LVI - LXV
ix
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ing with analysis in its last two volumes. Ayer himself is an editor 
of and writer for the Journal Analysis published six times each year at 
Oxford. The fact that Ayer has been chosen to write the important chap­
ter on the Vienna Circle in the recently published The Revolution in 
Philosophy is a c onclusive indication of the leadership he wields in 
the philosophical field. He was called upon to write the opening chap­
ter entitled "What is Communication?"in Studies in Communication, - a 
major publication of the Communications Research Centre, London Univers­
ity, - which clearly shows his influence outside the field of philosophy 
as well.
In his Scholasticism and Politics Jacques Maid.tain has devoted one 
full chapter to an analysis of logical positivism, and asserts the enormous 
effect it is having on modem culture and civilization. Mr. Maritain him­
self explicitly states that the reason he has spoken of the ideas of this 
school is that they " . . .  characterize rather well the average state of 
mind which, . . . will no doubt prevail among scientists and, especially,
among popularizers of science, with which we shall have to deal for some 
20time to come.'* Obviously Mr. Mari tain sees the necessity of looking 
seriously and thoroughly into the position and consequences of logical pos­
itivism. This seems in complete conformity with Pope Pius XII's exhorta­
tions set forth in the encyclical Humani Generis:
^  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vols. XV - XVI
20 Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, (London:
Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 19U0), p.32
x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
New Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it 
is to defend natural and supernatural truth and instil it in the 
hearts of men, cannot afford to ignore or neglect these more or less 
erroneous opinions. Rather they must come to understand these same 
theories well, both because diseases are not properly treated unless 
they are rightly diagnosed, and because sometimes even in these 
false theories a certain amount of truth is contained, and finally 
because these theories provoke more subtle discussion and evaluation 
of philosophical and theological truths. 21
Ol
His Holiness Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 195>0, tr,), p.$
xi
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ILIMITATION OF KNOWLEDGE BT LINGUISTIC RULES
In the opinion of Alfred Ayer, the traditional disputes of 
philosophers are indicative of a lack of suitable purpose and method 
in philosophical enquiries. It i3 his contention that, were the aim 
and method of philosophy properly established, there would be an end 
to the unwarranted and unfruitful disputes which beset philosophy.
Thus would be achieved that unity so necessary among philosophers.1 
In the conviction that he is able to achieve this unity, Ayer sets 
himself to the task. The first step which he feels assured will lead 
him to the discovery of philosophy’s aim and method is to criticize 
the claims of metaphysicians regarding the possibility of having know­
ledge "of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense."2 
He selects this matter as the primary subject for investigation because 
he considers it to be crucial to the manifestation of his own philosoph­
ical position on the aim and method of philosophy.
Ayer observes that many philosophers, now and in the past, have
3
maintained the possibility of knowing a transcendent reality. He advan­
ces the claim that those who make such metaphysical assertions do so,
■^ Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2 ed.,(London:
Victor Gollancz Ltd., 195U), P*33
2Ibid., p.33
Ayer has the Rationalists principally in mind, especially
1
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2not at all because of any conscious desire on their part to go beyond
1±experience, but only because of errors committed in logic, errors which 
have resulted in the false conclusion that there is a transcendent reality.^ 
By attacking the possibility of knowledge of any reality beyond sense-experi- 
ence, it is taken for granted by him that all other metaphysical disputes 
which presuppose a transcendent reality will be conveniently disposed of at 
the same time.^
It is at once clear that Ayer’s attitude towards any claim for the 
possibility of a transcendent reality is antagonistic. For, from what pre­
mises, he asks, are the propositions of metaphysicians deduced? He 'insists 
that their propositions should begin, as all men’s begin, - with the evi­
dence of the senses.^ On the strength of this principle, Ayer sceptically 
enquires what valid process of reasoning can possibly induce anyone to 
arrive at a concept of a transcendent reality. Ho inference, in M s  
opinion, concerning either the properties, or the existence, of a supra-
Descartes and Leibnitz. See Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp.l*6-l*7 
and pp.12lj.-li4*,* and Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, (London: MacMillan
& Co., 1956), p.1*1
^ As we shall see, on page 10, what Ayer means by "errors in 
logic" does not refer to errors in formal logic. The philosophical ana­
lysts have given a new meaning to logic. They speak of the logic of 
language which embodies rules for the standardised linguistic reference 
to experience.
' Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.33
6 Ibid., p.33
 ^Ibid., p.33
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8empirical reality, is valid from empirical premises. This is the 
empiricist postulate to which he subscribes. It is this empiricist 
assumption which will rule his position on each problem.
It is noted by Ayer that there have been many philosophers, such 
as Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza, together with those who have continued 
their Rationalist tradition, who held that metaphysical assertions are not 
due, even materially, to the evidence of the senses, but that an intellect­
ual intuition is adequate for all metaphysical statements. He represents 
such a metaphysician as saying:
. . .  he was endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which 
enabled him to know facts that could not be known through sense- 
experience. 9
As Ayer expresses his own position, he judges that he is not striving to 
overcome this traditional Rationalist metaphysics merely by criticizing the 
way in which it is arrived at. Rather, he says, it is to be overthrown
10through a criticism of the actual statements that make up metaphysics.
The uniqueness of the positivists’ attack on metaphysics is considered by 
them to lie in this very approach as supei’ior to any used in the past. ^  
For example, Ayer strongly believes that his own denouncement of what he
8 IbM*, p.33
9
Ibid., p.33 
Ibid., p.3U
11 "The positivists’ flavour of their thought comes out most strong­
ly in their hostility to metaphysics. Metaphysics, which they construed 
as covering such allegedly philosophical enterprises as the attempt to 
describe Reality as a whole, or to find the purpose of the universe, or to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
kcalls metaphysical utterances, will be deduced from what he considers to
be the rule which establishes the liberal significance of language. It
will not be derived from any psychological approach - which he notes
12others have employed in the past.
By using his own approach Ayer will come to his own conclusion 
that metaphysics, in its attempts to describe a so-called transcendent 
reality, is committed to the production of nonsense. In his own mind, he 
is assured that there is no such thing as metaphysics of any kind, nor 
does he anticipate having this preconception altered in the course of his 
critique of metaphysical statements.
In stressing the merits of his method over preceding ones, Ayer 
is merely saying that the proper approach for disposing of metaphysics is 
not to attempt a refutation of its claims to exist as a science, since to 
him it has no such claim. Instead, he is saying, take the metaphysical 
assertions which are wrongly assumed by metaphysicians to be factual, and 
judge each one of them separately on its own merits to discover whether it 
stands up to the rule which allows for the literal significance of factual 
statements, his insistence being that this is the only way by which meta­
physics can be successfully overthrown. For it does not follow that a 
metaphysical assertion is not true simply by arguing that the metaphysician 
has ventured illogically into a non-empirical world, regardless of whether
reach beyond the everyday world to some supra-sensible spiritual order, 
was condemned by them not as being unduly speculative, or even as being 
false, but as being non-sensical." Alfred J. Ayer, "The Vienna Circle", 
The Revolution in Philosophy, (Londonj MacMillan & Co., 1956), p.7U
12
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.35
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5he holds his premises to be based on experience, or on some false intellec­
tual intuition. Ayer supports this view on the grounds that a false premise
does not necessarily indicate that the statement of the conclusion follow-
13ing upon it is false.
It is Ayer’s consistent position that the validity of any statement 
must be able to stand, not in terms of the premises upon which it claims to 
have been constructed, but whether it can itself conform to the conditions
1Uunder which alone a sentence can be literally significant.
Ayer foresees that his condemnation of metaphysics could be taken 
by some to be a re-workihg of the anti-metaphysical grounds of Kant, under 
another label. But he insists that such is not the case.^ For one thing, 
in his estimation, Kant belongs to that class of critics which he opposes 
at the level of method. Furthermore, he holds it for certain that Kant 
never proved what he himself is able to prove about metaphysics. For he 
considers Kant’s deposition of metaphysics to be, if not ineffectual in 
its results, at least defective in the way it was done. For as Ayer under­
stands Kant, the latter held:
...that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost 
itself in contradictions when it ventured beyond the limits of 
possible experience and attempted to deal with things in them­
selves.
Thus, Ayer observes, Kant felt his arguments for the impossibility of a
13 Ibid., p. 3k
^  Ibid., p.35 
15 Ibid., p.3k
Ibid., p.3k. The Kantian position against a transcendent 
metaphysics is stated briefly in the preface to the 2nd. edition of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6transcendent metaphysics were a "matter of fact" rather than a "matter of 
17
logic".
The matter of fact which Ayer alludes to is that, after having 
made a psychological analysis of human powers, Kant concludes that the 
mind is, as a matter of fact, incapable of grasping anything but appear­
ances. Whereas, Ayer, on the other hand, claims no psychological analy­
sis precedes his similar conclusion. So it is not a matter of fact, but 
a matter of logic, by which metaphysics is attacked. Reaching a trans­
cendent reality on a factual basis, in Kant's opinion could not be done,
for our mind was in fact devoid of the powers of penetrating beyond -the 
18
phenomenal world.
Ayer realizes that in spite of this, Kant nonetheless asserted
that real things beyond the limits of sense-experience can be thought of
19as existing, but that our knowledge cannot reach those real things.
The Critique of Pure Reason:
«
For we are brought to the conclusion that we can never transcend the 
limits of possible experience, though that is precisely what the 
science is concerned, above all else, to achieve. This situation 
yields, however, just the very experiment by which, indirectly, we 
are enabled to prove the truth of this first estimate of our a priori 
knowledge of reason, namely, that such knowledge has to do only with 
appearances, and must leave the thing in itself, as indeed real ‘per 
se', but not as known by us. " I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 
(New York; Humanities Press, 1950), Preface 2nd ed., Norman Kent 
Smith ed. p. 2k
17
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.3k
Id
"He asserted, not that our minds could not conceivably have had 
the power of penetrating beyond the phenomenal world, but merely that they 
were in fact devoid of it." Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.3k
19 „
Thus it does indeed follow that all possible speculative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7Ayer is strongly critical of Kant's psychological way of opposing meta­
physics. This is indicated by two pointed questions. First, if it is 
possible to know only what lies within the bounds of sense-experience, how 
can one be justified in asserting that real things exist beyond it? Second­
ly, how can one tell what are the boundaries human understanding cannot
20
pass, unless one has succeeded in passing them himself? This interpret­
ation of Kant's method is valuable for our understanding of Ayer's doctrine. 
Not only does it illustrate Ayer's method, but it also reveals him as a 
more thoroughgoing empiricist than Kant was. Ayer's conscious determination 
to have it so discloses the distinctive temper of logical positivism.
For this criticism of Kant, Ayer is indebted to Ludwig Wittgenstein,
21
who played a major part in Ayer's philosophical thought. It is a prin­
ciple of Wittgenstein's that in order to set a limit to thinking one must
knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of appearance. But our furth­
er contention must also be borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot 
know these objects as things, we must yet be in a position at least to think 
them as things in themselves; otherwise we shall be landed on the absurd 
conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. "
I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Preface, 2 ed., p.27
20 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.3U
21
Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosophical analyst who lived near 
Vienna at the time the Vienna Circle was being formed in the early '20's.
He was never a member of the Circle, but his work Tractatus Logico-Philo- 
sophicus "set the pattern which at least in the early days, the Vienna 
Circle followed", according to Ayer, "The Vienna Circle", The Revolution in 
Philosophy, p. 70. He later went to Cambridge where, along with Bertrand, 
Russell, he became the dominant influence in the Cambridge School of Philo­
sophical Analysis. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicua is a work aiming at 
the conditions required for a logically perfect language. Its fundamental 
thesis is that in order that a certain sentence should assert a certain 
fact there must, howsoever the language may be constructed, be something 
between the structure of the language and the structure of the fact. He 
holds that there should be an ideal language having an exclusive one-for-one 
relation between the symbol and the fact. But this relationship does not in 
any case imply an intrinsic connection between facts and language.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
22
have to think both sides of the limit. This principle Ayer uses to 
object to Kant's overstepping the limits he himself laid down. Now, Ayer 
also, in laying down a rule of literal significance, imposes a limitation 
on knowledge and excludes metaphysics thereby. This he freely acknow­
ledges. He insists, nonetheless, that the principle of Wittgenstein's 
cannot be levelled against him. In fact, he feels he is, in his own way, 
being faithful to and supporting Wittgenstein's views in attacking meta­
physics. Ayer's argument is that he does not assume or postulate any 
barrier whatsoever to human knowledge after the manner in which he feels 
Kant does. For he maintains that he, on the other hand, deduces the 
inpossibility of transcending the limits of possible sense-experience, 
not from a psychological assumption of the human mind, but rather he
deduces that impossibility from the rule which, in his opinion, determines
23
the literal significance of language.
Apparently Ayer is willing enough to limit knowledge, as did Kant, 
provided it be clear that he does so on different grounds. Just as his 
reason for invalidating Kant's manner of establishing the limit is due to 
Wittgenstein’s influence, so too his reason far limiting it in the way he 
does is drawn from the same authority. Wittgenstein concludes that since 
a limit cannot be drawn to thinking, then we can and must draw the limit 
in language. The reason he gives for not being able validly to set a
22 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (London; 
Kegan Paul, 1922), p.63, U.003
23 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, P.3!?
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9limit to knowledge itself is that, to do so, involves the impossible task
2h
of having to think what cannot be thought.
Drawing a limit only in language enables Ayer to make the arbi­
trary ruling that words can only be used when they apply to sense-experi- 
ences. Such a linguistic limitation classifies any use of words not refer­
ring to sense-experience as nonsense. A word will have the significance 
that Ayer imposes upon it, and the norm of his imposition will be sense- 
experience. Ayer never expressly says why his norm is such as it is, but 
it is clear that, in order to accept Wittgenstein's formula, he must first 
have accepted the empiricists• postulates. The practical aspects of this 
principle of language calls for as precise a relationship as possible to 
be worked out between the words used and the diverse contents of sense- 
experience to which they refer. This is a cardinal feature of the logic 
of language which is central to logical positivism. And it is to this 
that Ayer is referring when he claims how he, as a "matter of logic" in 
contrast to Kant's "matter of fact", will make a transcendent metaphysics 
impossible.
Many people fail to understand the nature of language as Ayer sees
^  "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof on© 
cannot speak therefore one must be silent.
The book (Tractatus logico- Philosophicus) will, therefore, draw 
a limit to thinking, or rather - not to thinking but to the expression of 
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking, we should have to be 
able to think both sides of the limit. We should therefore have to be 
able to think what cannot be thought.
The limit can therefore only be drawn in language, and what lies 
on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense." L. Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus etc., Preface, p.27
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it. And it is due to this failure on their part, he argues, that they
quite readily make sentences which are literally nonsensical without ever 
25
realizing it. Such unwitting tendencies are the occasions for those
26"errors in logic" that Ayer speaks of by which the metaphysician finds 
himself, without desiring it, beyond the limits of experience.^
Many metaphysical assertions are due to what Ayer terms "the in­
fection of the primitive superstition" that to every real name a single
2 S
real entity corresponds. And so, those who think this way arrive at
the supposed entity through falsely assuming a necessity to distinguish
logically between the thing itself and its sensible properties. In view
of the fact that we do use the word "its", for instance, in referring to
appearances we form the impression that we are distinguishing between
the appearance and the thing to which it refers. Ayer sees this as but
29
one of the accidents of linguistic usage; Uhereas the fact of the
matter is that this seeming relation of sensible appearance to the thing
itself is nothing more than the relationship of one appearance to another.
30Ayer contends that logical analysis will make this clear. It is by
25 Ay®r> Language, Truth and Logic, p.UU
26
See p.2, note li
27
"The metaphysician does not intend to write nonsense. He 
lapses into it through being deceived by grammar, or through committing 
errors in reasoning, such as that which leads to the view that the 
sensible world is unreal." Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.U5
28
Ibid., p.1*2
2 9
Ibid., p.lj2 
Ibid., p.1*2
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being misled in such ways as this, through what Ayer calls the superficial
grammatical features of his language, that the metaphysician wrongly
31assumes that natures racist.
"What we have done, up to this point, is to see how Ayer intends 
to eliminate metaphysical disputes from philosophy in order to prepare the 
way for establishing the aim and method of philosophical enquiries. Far­
ther, we hare caught a glimpse of the central relation between the denial 
of metaphysical utterances, on the one hand, and the establishment of ad« 
and method in philosophy, cm the other. The preoccupation with the valid­
ity of factual statements indicates the direction which his conception of 
philosophical enquiry will take, and what the type of unity consequent upon 
it will be.
Having taken such a firm stand on factual statements, Ayer is
aware of the necessity of justifying his position. In point of fact, Ayer
realizes that he must set forth some criterion for determining what are
factual statements. The notion that genuine factual statements could be
established by means of the role for literal significance was thought at
first to have been clear enough in principle. It promised to be a simple 
32
procedure. It seemed clear that all one had to do was to accept or 
reject statements on the basis of the rule. But when attempts were made to 
state the rule, obstacles arose. It had originally been presupposed that, 
since the revered empiricist postulates favoured only sense-experience,
31
32
Ibid., p.1*2 
Ibid., p.3I>
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they would be directly productive of a thoroughly sound criterion, both in 
principle and in practice. However, those same postulates stood in the way 
of the results Ayer would have liked his criterion to produce. For, in the 
process of arriving at a statement of the criterion, the matter became 
more than just an anti-metaphysical one, since the problem of having any
33
conclusive knowledge whatever was seriously raised as well.
Before proceeding to its solution we must realize that the criter­
ion is but one factor of an integrated philosophical doctrine which we have 
set out to explore. Consequently, its solution is intimately bound up with 
Ayer1s doctrine as a whole. The criterion is a subordinate and dependent 
method belonging to the more general aim and method in philosophy. It is 
simply one of the stages of his methodological procedure involved in philo­
sophical enquiry. It ranks first only in application, in as much as it 
indicates what statements are eligible for philosophical analysis. But it 
is not first in doctrinal importance. By reason of the fact that it has 
its origins in more fundamental postulates it is inseparable from them.
The question of its definitive formulation must always be relative to the 
solution of the more basic things. That is to say, it must conform to the 
conditions laid down by them. For that reason we must proceed now to a 
consideration of those more basic tenets that we may ultimately show both 
the solution of the criterion and the aim and method of philosophy of 
which it is a part.
"But even for the Vienna Circle philosojhical problems did not dis­
appear so easily. The old perplexities of what is called the theory 
of knowledge came out again as soon as there was a question of decid­
ing exactly what was meant by a statement being verifiable." Ayer,
"The Vienna Circle", The Revolution in Philosophy, p.80
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II
THE NATURE OF THE “GIVEN"
Ayer's criterion is demanded by and develops out of his basic 
empiricist assumptions. The absolutely basic starting point of his philo­
sophy is not his criterion for determining factual propositions."^ In 
order to see how this is so it is necessary to explain two basic pointsj 
first, what Ayer holds a matter of fact to be, and second, when he consid­
ers a statement describes a matter of fact.
With respect to the first point, since Ayer's position on what a 
matter of fact is involves his sense-data theory, it is necessary at this 
stage to consider the essential factors in that theory. As to the second 
point, a thorough understanding about when a statement describes a matter 
of fact is contingent upon the sens e-data theory as well. And so while 
we hhall first show the matter of fact element of the sense-data theory, 
the explanation of the way in which facts are described will be forth­
coming as the presentation of the theory proceeds. In this chapter we 
will take up the first point.
Since the criterion is concerned with facts we must know what 
Ayer considers facts precisely to be. When Ayer speaks of facts he means
^ It should be borne In mind that while the terms "sentence", 
"statement" and "proposition" may appear to be mutually interchangeable 
according to Ayer's use of them, they actually are not in every respect.
He uses each of them in the particular meaning he has given to it. For 
him a "sentence" is a form of words grammatically significant, but not 
necessarily having what he terms "literal significance" or "literal mean­
ing" - a metaphysical assertion would be a case in point. An indicative 
sentence, whether literally meaningful or not, expresses a "statement". A
13
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only empirical facts. There are no other kinds of facts. "And we may
explain", says Ayer, "that we give the name ’empirical fact1 to whatever
can be factually o b s e r v e d . We have now to see what this statement
involves in detail. In his own special sense of "object" Ayer assumes the
first directly observed object is sense-data. For him sense-data are the
self-evident starting point of knowledge. There is nothing else to which
they can be referred for verification, since they are the first object of 
3
perception. All else is referred to them. They are that of which the 
knower is immediately aware in a sensation, or, a sense-perception. This 
awareness is referred to generally as sense-experience. Any single sense- 
experience which one is having is made up of sense-fields. Those things 
which constitute that sense-field in a particular instance are called 
sense-contents, or sense-data.^ Ayer defines a sense-datum "as anything 
that is the constituent of a sense-field."'
statement which is literally meaningful is a "proposition". That is to 
say, a proposition is a sub-class of the class of sentences.
2 Alfred J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. (London: 
MacMillan & Co., 19U7), p.9$
•5
"I can therefore claim to be using the word "sense-datum" in 
such a way that there can be no doubt that sense-data actually are 
experienced.
In following this procedure, I shall, I think, be giving to 
the word "sense-datum" the meaning that the philosophers who have 
adapted the "theory of sense-data" have, in general, intended it to have, 
... And the definition of sense-data that these philosophers commonly give 
is that they are the objects of which, in sense-perception, one is direct­
ly aware." Ibid., p.3>9
^ Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.66
5 Alfred J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays, (London: MacMillan & Co.,
19$k), p.130
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To say that a sense-datum is a constituent of a sense-field does
not imply, according to Ayer, that a sense-datum is a kind of object of
knowledge which is achieved by a mental act distinct from the object. To
speak of mental act when referring to knowledge of sense-data could raise
the whole problem of a knowing subject, of an external object, and of an
act of knowing, none of which Ayer accepts.8 Such notions are invalid
according to him. The principal basis for this opinion is that Ayer
claims there is no empirical evidence whatsoever from which there could be
established the notion of a "mind'' as something distinct from and support-
ing mental events said to proceed from it. Ayer holds that ,fbecause it
is assumed that every activity must have its special organ, a mythical
8
entity is brought in to do the work." To avoid the assumption would be
9to avoid the needless faculties.
He holds all the five major factors which he deems constitute a 
realist theory of knowledge, namely, 1) the person who thinks, 2) the 
faculty with which one thinks, 3) the process itself, U) that there are 
images which are a medium of knowledge, and, 5) that an external object 
of thought is identified with the images, to be untenable. For he takes 
them to be five assumptions which merit the term mythical. And so the
^ Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.122
? Alfred J. Ayer, Thinking and Meaning, (London: H. K. Lewis &
Co., 19I4.7), p.5
8 Ibid., p.5
9
"For if it is assumed -that every activity requires an instru­
ment to set it going, then the instrument will itself require a further 
instrument, and so "ad infinitum", while if we do not make this assump­
tion there is no need for the faculties in the first place." Ibid., p.17
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term "object", when used to refer to a sense-datum, does not stand for 
10
an external thing. Ayer maintains that whenever one sees a physical 
object one just perceives a seeming-object, as he puts it, for "these seem­
ing objects", he says, "are sense-data j and the conclusion may be more
simply expressed by saying that it is always sense-data that are directly 
11
perceived."
Such a notion considers a sense-datum to be merely the simple occur­
rence of a sensation which in itself implies nothing. It is neither refer­
ential nor intentional. No definition of sense-data then, as he understands 
it, entails the analysis of sense-data for,being basic, they are unanalys­
able. The expression "directly aware", used in the definition, must not be 
taken to suggest by inference that there is a reality that goes beyond the 
immediate sense-data themselves, - since sense-data are not a means, in a
vicarious sense, by which we know reality, even though their awareness is
12
a condition of knowledge.
It is emphatically stated that sense-data are themselves reality:
"For to say that an object is immediately "given" is to say merely that it
10 Ibid., p.25
Alfred J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, (London: MacMillan & Co.,
1956) p.106
1 p
"And indeed, if it is essential to knowledge that the object 
known should exist independently of the knowing of it, I have implicitly
denied that our awareness of sense-data is a kind of knowing, for I have
made it a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of sense- 
data that they should in fact be experienced." Ayer, The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge, pp.78-79
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is the content of a sense-experience, and we are very far from maintain-
13ing that our s ens e-experienc es have no real content, . . . "
The advantage of the sense-data theory is that it makes no distinc­
tion between real and apparent characteristics of sense-data.^ According 
to Ayer, our awareness of sense-data is not the descriptions, or images of 
a sensible reality, but sense-data are the immediate reality itself. This 
position is what must be held by Ayer, once he asserts that the "objects" 
of which we are directly aware are sense-data. The reason is that,rather 
than treat of our perceptual appearances in terms of "mind" or "material 
things", he has chosen to use sense-data as the units for describing our 
experiences. This decision commits one into a reverse procedure from what 
one could normally expect, for one must now ask how such conceptions as
"mind" and "material things" and "physical space" are analysed in terms of
1$
sense-data, rather than the other way round. Ayer does not consider 
such a decision on his part to be wholly arbitrary, since it conforms 
more to the characteristics of the "given" of which we are directly aware.
Although Ayer speaks of sense-data as being "reality", to his way 
of thinking one cannot correctly say that sense-data "exist" however. To 
use the word "exist" when referring to sense-data must, in his opinion,
^  Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.121
^  Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.261;
1<
"If we agree to say that the objects of which we are directly 
aware are sense-data then we are deciding to treat them and not minds or 
material things as the units in terms of which we are to describe our 
perceptual experiences. The question, therefore, that we must ask is not 
how sense-data are to be incorporated into the categories of mind or 
matter or whereabouts they are to be located in physical space, but rather
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be used with the same precaution as the word "object" is used of them, in
view of the implications of what a false inference could suggest, that is,
the inference that they were the appearance of things. For that reason
Ayer warns that:
, . , it seeius advisable always to speak of the "occurrence" of 
sense-contents and sense-experiences in preference to speaking of 
their "existence", and so to avoid the danger of treating sense- 
contents as if they were material things. 16
As to the background or origin of this "occurrence", the problem 
cannot be raised at all in Ayer's consideration. Consequently, he offers 
no reason as to why any sense-data should ever occur. They simply occur. 
And beyond that, no single one of the sense-data has any intrinsic connec­
tion with another. Hence, there is no causal relationship between one
17sense-experience and another.
Even though Ayer insists on the direct awareness of sense-data as 
the first "given", he does not find it a difficult matter to explain why 
or how people do think in terms of "material things". He assures us that 
he himself really "believes" in objects like "tables" and "chairs", and he 
is satisfied that they really "exist", even though we do not experience 
them, for they are not the content of a sense-experience. ^  One of his
how our conceptions of "mind" and "material, things", and "physical space" 
are to be analysed in terms of them." Ibid., p.78
*1 Z
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.123
17 "But the reason why I do not take it (cause and effect) into 
account is simply that this idea of necessary connection has no counter­
part at all in the observable facts." Ayer, The Foundations of Empiri­
cal Knowledge, p.183. See The Problem of Knowledge, p.217
^  Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.l
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consistent claims is that our "beliefs" in the reality of such things as 
"tables" and "chairs" have nothing to do directly with empirical facts of 
sense-data. The prevalence of delusive perceptions is evidence for him 
that what we directly experience is always a sense-datum and never a mater­
ial thing.^
According to his understanding of it, our thinking of things in
terms of being material is based on an assumption that is a consequence of
the way in which we make use of sense-data. This belief in material things
is not due to the nature of our perceptions, but due to an attitude of mind
20
based on past experiences. "Belief" is a term Ayer uses to explain an 
attitude one has towards a thing without being completely sure of it.
Being sure does not mean having subjective confidence for Ayer, but having 
conformity of facts to experience with or without the subjective feeling.
21
When one is sure in this sense, one has knowledge as distinct from belief. 
To have "belief" in the "reality" of "material things", and not to be 
properly apprised that it is an indirect perception only, regardless of 
how assured one feels of it being right, is to misconceive such perceptions 
of material things as being directly perceived in fact, and so, to lack the 
surety required for true knowledge.
Ayer notes that it is characteristic of our beliefs in "material 
-things” that their existence and properties are independent of any parti­
cular observer. We make this assumption, says Ayer, on the supposition
19 Ibid., p.9
20 P*7
?1
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.13
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that material things continue the same "whether they are observed by one 
person or another, or not observed at all. That is, for instance, a 
"table" appears differently to one who is facing it from the front, than 
it appears to one who is experiencing it from an end view. Yet both refer 
to it as "this table here". Those who assume that the direct objects of 
our experiences are "material things" say that both persons are experienc­
ing the same thing. Whereas the truth of the matter is, Ayer would say, 
each one is experiencing his own sense-data.
The whole difficulty with the "material thing" mode of referring 
to sense-data is, from Ayer‘s standpoint, that so much of what we say is 
illusive. That is, we can refer to a coin as being circular, but, accord­
ing to the appearance it may present, it is really elliptical when its 
surface is tilted. Ayer proposes that the use of direct sense-data 
reference enables one to avoid the inevitable illusion. It is preferable 
to refer to the experience directly as it appeal's, and not to a material 
thing. There is no illusion about the objects we immediately experience 
since they are sense-data themselves. Sense-data, for Ayer, are not in 
any case material things. The occurrence of a particular sense-datum can­
not be justified in terms of anything other than itself - being a self-
evident "given", - whereas the knowledge of the properties of "material
22
things" must be justified through the medium of sense-data.
22
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.11, and The 
Froblems of Knowledge, p.97
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It would seem then that "material things" or "physical objects" are 
always dependent in every respect upon sense-data. In addition, when it 
comes to expressing the sense-data themselves, it is found, by Ayer, that 
sense-data also have a dependence on "physical objects". By referring to 
an experience of anything, how could one succeed fully in making oneself 
understood about it in terms of sense-data alone? That is, how could one, 
for example, express the appearance of a rose without in some way indicat­
ing that it was a rose one was experiencing? Such a term would have to be 
a "physical object" reference. Ayer finds that the sense-data terms are 
not sufficiently worked out to indicate experience adequately without fall­
ing back on "physical objects". For this reason Ayer has to admit that the 
notion of sense-data is not precise - at least, it is not as precise as it 
was once hoped it would be in order to justify the analysis of "physical
objects". In fact, the precision that it actually does have is due to the
23
way we talk about "physical objects". However, by the very fact that 
sense-data terms always directly refer to sense-data themselves, even when 
a physical object term is included in the expression, then sense-data
2k
terms are still the means of justifying "physical objects".
We have seen that the expression "material thing" must be justified 
as a reference to experience in terms of the basic sense-data themselves, 
for a sense-datum is a matter of fact, while a "material thing" is not. 
Nevertheless, Ayer allows that it is just as valid to refer to sense-data
^  Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.122
2l* Ibid., p.l2U
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as "material things" as it is to accept the fact of sense-data, as long as 
one knows how the expression "material things" is used, so as to avoid the 
error of assuming them to be the direct reality which is experienced. It 
must be noted that when we use the expression "material thing" or "physic­
al object", in referring to a sense-datum, we are not speaking directly
about the sense-datum itself, but a way in which we are making use of the 
2$
sense-datum.
There is an important feature about Ayer's notion of a matter of 
fact that would be well to mention here, for, although it has its applica­
tion in the verifiability of propositions, it pertains to an aspect of
sense-data themselves. We stated earlier in this chapter that Ayer gives
26
the name "fact" to what can be factually observed. The significance of
the word "can" in his definition indicates that Ayer does not limit facts
to what are actually observed here and now, but includes also the possibil­
ity of being observed. Nor must the experience be an exclusively personal 
one. In stating that " a sense-datum is that of which one is directly 
aware", the "one" referred to as being aware is inpersonal, lhat is actu­
ally experienced by someone else has not, of necessity, to be experienced 
by another individual in order to be accepted by him as a fact. He has only 
to see that he could make a similar observation under favourable circum­
stances. It is not even necessary to know who the observer is, in any giv­
en case, since all one has to do is "to 'place* the situation in which the
27
observations are supposed to be made." Consequently, Ayer's more
? Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 1$L
26 See P.m.
2? Ayer, The Problems of Knowledge, p.137
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complete definition of a sense-datum is "an object of which it is conceiv-
20able that someone should be directly aware."
Such a notion of sense-data being impersonal, and not necessarily 
being actually present, is purposely conceived in order to take in the 
findings of science. It enables a physicist, for example, to put a reason­
able reliance on the findings of another physicist. All he requires is 
that he have sufficient information from the first "observers" report to
enable him to judge that, in suitable conditions, he himself could observe 
29them. This is supported by a principle advanced by Ayer, that "there
is nothing in an experience considered by itself, . . .  to make it form
30part of one person's history rather than another's."
There is one further point required in order to come to the com­
plete notion of what Ayer considers a fact to be. Sense-datum, as we have 
seen, is a simple awareness. "Awareness" has a very precise meaning for 
Ayer, which merits some attention. He holds awareness to be something 
which in itself does not arrive at the level of knowledge. Experience, in
itself, is sterile, for " . . .  experiences -themselves are neither certain
31nor uncertain? they simply occur." Knowledge, on the other hand, is 
acquired only in propositions, and so the full notion of what a fact is
a O
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.59 
^  Ibid., p.l6U
30 Ibid., p.l69
31
Ibid., pp.78-79. See fhe Problem of Knowledge, p.5U
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32properly involves knowledge of the fact as well as the occurrence of it.
Consequently, what is counted as a fact for Ayer depends partly on our
33conceptual scheme together with sense-data. By this he means the way in
which we predicate things. And in this matter Ayer restricts the choice
3^4*of predicates to what can be tested by the making of an observation.
This is quite arbitrary on his part, but in view of his empiricism, he has
no other choice. Thus he must admiti
If there is a point in saying, that only what can be 
experienced exists, . . . it is to lay down conditions for the 
legitimacy of descriptive expressions: we are to admit only 
such expressions as apply directly or indirectly to what can 
be experienced. 35
Ayer defends himself against any objection to this restriction by resorting 
to a wholly pragmatic justification.
We are now in a position to understand Ayer’s solution to that 
first basic point, namely, what a matter of fact is. He dogmatically 
assumes, without investigating whether there be other possibilities, that 
the word ’’fact” includes only what can be observed in sense-experience.
For he says a sentence is factually significant when one knows what
32J ”To avoid ambiguity, I shall in the future use the word 
"awareness” only in connection with sense-data, and the word "percep­
tion” only in connection with material things, and I shall restrict the 
use of the word "knowledge" to its prepositional sense." Ayer, The 
Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.79
33 Ayer, Philosophical Essays, p.229
3lt Ibid., p.229 
35
Ibid., P.227
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
observation would lead one to accept the proposition as being true, or
36
not. And the observation to which he refers is limited to the only 
observable which he allows - the direct awareness of sense-data.
&  Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.3$
57355 
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'•PHYSICAL OBJECT" LANGUAGE
Having settled what a matter of fact is, oar next problem is to 
discover when Ayer considers that a statement expresses a matter of fact. 
The answer has already been implicitly introduced to us in the foregoing 
remarks on the role of predicates in accounting for a matter of fact. The 
choice of predicates is tied up so much with experience for Ayer that he 
considers "our enquiry into the use of words to be regarded as an enquiry 
into the notion of the facts which they describe". ^ They are, nonethe­
less, obviously distinct. A predicate belongs to a proposition, and so 
is but once removed from the simple awareness of sense-data. The forming 
of propositions about sense-data is a function distinct from the direct 
awareness of sense-data. This is indicated through there being more than 
one way by which it is done. For we have only to contrast a sense-data 
statement with a physical object statement to find that, although they are 
different types of expression, the experience they refer to is the same. 
When one speaks of the occurrence of a sense-experience one is making a 
different kind of statement entirely from one about a material thing exist­
ing. Ayer asserts that:
The proposition that I am holding a pen in my hand is not equi­
valent to any proposition or set of propositions that describe my 
present experiences, though they provide me with the only grounds I 
have for asserting it. ^
* Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.26
2 Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. p.6o
26
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In the former case, what Ayer calls “physical object" language is being 
used and in the latter case, "sense-data" language. No one of these em­
bodies any more factual discovery of experience than the other.^ They are
in no way to be regarded as alternative theories of reality, but as alter- 
iinative languages. It is Ayer's opinion that sense-data language enables
one to refer to the same facts expressed by physical object language in a
<
clearer and more convenient way, while adding nothing to the facts.
Language is the second central feature of Ayer's philosophy. Accord­
ing to him, we do not leave sense-data in its simple state of occurrence 
but put it to use in linguistic statements. Just as sense-data is a basic 
"given" for Ayer, so too is language a "given". Ayer argues this on the 
conviction that language is a self-evident fact in any cultural pattern. The 
possibility of doing without words in referring to empirical facts is un­
acceptable to Ayer.^ Of course, language is not as basic a "given" as 
sense-data, since the elements of language have a conventional feature about
them. The elements which make up language are symbols which may be either
7
simple words, or sentences. They are arbitrary in the sense that it is 
conceivable that any other symbol could have been used to refer to the mat­
ter of fact in question. However, the accepted convention to refer to a
3 Ibid., P. 23
h
Ibid.. P.55
5 Ibid., p.26
6
Ibid., P.92
7 Ibid., P.93
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fact by one regular symbol rather than by any other indicates a certain
8
stability and dependence upon the symbol itself. That is to say, we find 
it more convenient to refer to facts almost invariably as "physical objects" 
rather than some other way. The farther point is made by Ayer that the sym­
bol's dependence upon the actual experience for which it stands makes the
9
symbol's function more than a trivial and arbitrary one.
The notion of language being a "given" is further brought out by the 
fact that Ayer does not consider the mere naming of an experience by its 
appropriate symbol as adding anything significant to our knowledge of the 
experience. As we saw in chapter II, only statements of experience properly 
reach the level of experience. All prior to that are the basic data provid­
ing the conditions for knowledge.^®
In this matter o f symbols Ayer takes the position that there is 
no necessary connection between a particular sense-datum and the sumbol 
employed in referring to it. He insists that it is useless to search, as 
so many do, for "the other term of the relation of meaning" between a 
symbol and seme unspecified object corresponding to it, since there is no 
such relationship. Ihat one is really searching for in such cases is an
8 Ibid., p.lUO
^ Ayer, Thinking and Meaning, p. 27
10 "But suppose I intend merely to name what I am seeing But
if that is all I am doing, then I am not saying anything at all. I can 
be neither wrong nor right." Ayer, Philosophical Essays, p.ll6
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11
understanding of the way in which the symbol is used. It is true 
that such symbols, especially those belonging to sense-data language, 
have direct connection with observable facts, but this is not a necess­
ary connection. The fact that the symbol "red" means a specific colour 
of sense-data is simply the result of a conventional choice to refer to 
the colour that way. Any other word would be a satisfactory one, as long 
as it is understood as such by those prescribing to its use. This con­
ventional connection is spoken of as the non-formal rule of a symbol in 
contrast to the formal rules within the language itself to which the sym­
bol belongs."^
In our discussion of Ayer's position on sense-data in chapter U  
we saw that he holds sense-data have nothing whatever to do with a think­
ing substance, nor with a substance to be known. Since then only sense- 
data exist, - which in his sense of the word means only to occur, - what 
case does he make for the philosophical concepts of substance and ego?
We will now see how he handles each of these notions in turn. They will 
serve to illustrate how major philosophical problems are solved according 
to his principles. We will treat of substance first.
The problem of substance in Ayer's doctrine has already been 
touched upon where we showed one of his examples of how he claims it is
11 Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.97
12 "What is not necessary is that a symbol, the use of which is 
determined by a non-formal rule, should have any further connection with 
what it symbolizes beyond that which is constituted by the rule".
Ibid., p.107
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possible to commit "errors in logic" which led some people into meta-
13
physical utterances. He observed that we employ the term "substance"
to stand for a thing which we erroneously suppose to be the entity which
underlies the sensible properties of a thing. For this reason, he says,
metaphysicians " . . .  employ the term ’substance' to refer to the thing 
lkitself." It is not until he comes to the question of whether sense-
con tents can exist without being experienced that he gives us his final
solution to the problem. He insists that there is no empirical evidence
15to account for the existence of substance. He makes it clear that he 
does not accept the realist analysis of sensation in which the notion of 
entities, existing in the material world as objects of knowledge, is a 
necessary condition of the knowing process
The mistaken notion that there is a supposed thing underlying its 
appearances can be accounted for by the relation of one sense-content to 
another. The word "exists" used to refer to a sense-content, or sense- 
datum, does not mean to imply that a sense-datum has a substantial exist­
ence and that the sense-datum "thing" is an object of knowledge, in the 
realist sense of "exist ence" and "object". For, to say that a sense- 
datum exists is to say no more than that it occurs; and, to say that a
13 see p.xo
lk
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.k2
15
Ibid., p. 122
16
Ibid., p. 122 
17 Ibid., p. 123
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sense-datum is an object is to say not more than that it is part of a 
sense-experience
The word "exist", as used in physical object language in referring 
to the existence of a material thing, must not be applied to a sense-con­
tent as if it were an entity according to a realist theory of reality, but
19only according to a theory of language. For a material thing is a log­
ical construct, while a sense-content is simply a part of a sense-sxperi-
20
ence which occurs as one complete whole.
Ayer maintains that when we are distinguishing between one material 
thing and another material thing it is merely the expression of the relation 
between one logical construct and another logical construct conjoined under 
some formal rule of language. They are the linguistic counterpart of the 
relation prevailing between different sense-data in a sense-field. These 
logical constructions are merely the result of a conventional way of refer­
ring to sense-contents. And, in view of the fact that they are convention­
al, when logical constructions are used in relation to one another as 
symbols in a proposition according to the internal rules of the language,
18
Ibid., P.122
19 "For my argument has shown that if we do not make this unwar­
ranted assumption we have to regard the thesis of naive realism, not as an 
assertion of fact, but as a proposal to use words in a certain fashion; . .
. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.l|8
20 >iF0r -the existence of a material thing is defined in terms of 
the actual and possible occurrence of the sense-contents which constitute 
it as a logical cons traction, and one cannot significantly speak of a 
sense-experience, which is a whole composed of sense-contents, or of a 
sense-content itself as if it were a logical construction out of sense- 
contents.** Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.123
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this relationship in no way implies that the sense-contents for which they 
stand are related to one another as substances in a sense-field. It must 
always be borne in mind that for Ayer the logical constructs constituted 
out of sense-data are not actual constructs having an absolutely necessary 
relation to the sense-data from which they are constituted, but only a
21
construct of language having a conventional relationship to sense-data.
The distinction made between two logical constructions in physical
object terms, that is, between two "substances", and the distinction made
between the two sense-contents which were the elements out of which they
were constructed are different kinds of distinctions, and they have no in-
22
trinsic connection. In the first case, the distinction of material 
things is one of language which, because of its special character, misleads 
one into assuming that things, or substances, exist as the immediate 
"given".
In the second case, the distinction is merely the relation between 
two sense-contents in a sense-field which together make up one whole aware­
ness, and is in fact the actual "given". The physical object language is
23
simply an accepted way of organizing sense-data. Inasmuch as it refers
21 "And it may be advisable here to repeat, when we refer to an 
object as a logical construction out of certain sense-contents, we are not 
saying that it is actually constructed out of those sense-contents, or 
that the sense-contents are in any way part of it, bat are merely express­
ing, in a convenient, if somewhat misleading fashion, the syntactical fact 
that all sentences referring to it are translatable into sentences refer­
ring to them." Ibid., p.123
22 P-121*
2^ Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.l6
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solely to the description of sense-data it is validly used. And so the 
word "substance" which belongs to physical object terminology has its valid 
place in this kind of description. But once it is taken to be factual, and 
not simply descriptive, it is invalid. In virtue of the fact that physical 
objects belong to a theory with respect to the evidence of the senses, ^  
the statements of which are so characterized as to do more than simply re­
describe sense-data, Ayer agrees that: . .it does not greatly matter
whether we say that the objects which figure in it are theoretical construc­
tions, or whether, in line with common sense, we prefer to say that they are 
independently real." That is, that they are existing substances. This 
is with the reservation, of course, that "in line with common sense" is in 
the order of description, and not of fact. In other words, there is no 
actual concession to the realist position here, but merely a pragaatic ac­
knowledgement in the conventional way of speaking. This is a farther example 
of Ayer's pragmatic principle.
The solution of the notion of ego can be dealt with more briefly, 
since, being in the class of substances as far as physical objects are con­
cerned, Ayer treats of it in a similar manner. The problem of the ego
centres around the question whether sense-contents "are in any way private
27to a single self." As with all other substances, the solution is not 
2k
Ibid., p.1?
25
Ibid., p.55
26
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.11*7
27
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.122
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to be found in empirical evidence. It is maintained by Ayer that: "Neith­
er the existence of the substance which is supposed to perform the so-called 
act of sensing, nor the existence of the act itself,... is in the least 
capable of being verified." ^8
A sense-datum, since it is a simple awareness, is neither referen­
tial nor intentional and so leads to nothing beyond itself. The false 
notion that the self is a knowing substance has its basis in the false dis­
tinction between "mind" and "matter", which two terms can be nothing more
po
than a distinction of logical constructions. 7 Ayer admits that there is 
a sense in which it can be said that a given sense-content can be experi­
enced by a particular subject:
But we shall see that this relation of being experienced by a 
particular subject is to be analysed in terms of the relationship of 
sense-contents to one another, and not in terms of a substantival 
ego and its mysterious acts. 30
And this relation of a sense-content with the particular subject 
experiencing it is the same as the relationship of material thing to mater­
ial thing, and of mind to matter. That is, it is a relation of logical 
construction to logical construction which, as we saw earlier in this chap­
ter, describes in language only the relation between the elements out of 
which the logical constructions were constituted. ,rWe know that a self,
28
* Ibid.. p.122
29 Ibid., p.121;
3Q Ibid., p.122
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if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity," Ayer remarks, "mast
31be held to be a logical construction out of sense-experiences."
This particular logical construction of "the self" corresponds
linguistically to the relation of a group of sense-data in a sense-field
at any given moment. It is a matter of identity with what occurs in one's
consciousness. This conscious awareness of a series of sense-experiences
constitutes a sense-history which is identified with the one experiencing 
32it. This sense-history is described in physical object language by 
such terms as "past", "disposition", and "memory"; and in sense-data
language, by reference to the continuous field of consciousness in the
. 33organism.
To say an experience is "mine" does not imply a substantival ego
in Ayer's doctrine, but it is simply the description of the ownership of
an experience. Instead of implying substance, "it is rather", he asserts,
"that to refer to an experience demonstratively is to preclude any doubt
3kabout its ownership; there can be no question whose it is." Ayer holds 
personal identity to be constituted by the presence of a certain factual
31 Ibid., p.125
32
"It is, in fact, a logical construction out of the sense- 
experiences which constitute the actual and possible sense-history of 
a self. And, accordingly, if we ask what is the nature of the self, 
we are asking what is the relationship that must obtain between sense- 
experiences for them to belong to the sense-history of the same self." 
Ibid., p.125
33 Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.114;
31;
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.223
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
relation between experiences, for he pragmatically doubts if one can talk 
about experiences except as the experiences of a person. It is realized 
by Ayer -that it would be nonsensical to suggest that an experience could 
exist entirely on its own, and so, M. . .we cannot talk of experiences
in a certain relation between experiences. Ayer grants this and feels 
justified in permitting it:
And then we seem to involve ourselves in a circle when we 
make the existence of persons consist only in a certain relation­
ship between experiences. But I do not think that this circle is 
vicious. It shows that we could not understand what is meant by 
an experience unless we already understood what was meant by 
being a personj but, as we have already seen in other instances, 
to understand what is meant by an expression does not entail that 
one can give a satisfactory analysis of its use. So even if the 
existence of an experience entails the existence of a person, an 
al identity in terms of experience could still
The plausibility of a person as the subject of experiences is not in the 
least to be taken from the "even if" remark that experience entails the 
prior existence of a person. It is merely a linguistic frame of refer­
ence. Ayer's case for personal identity can be no more than "that it is
the relation that holds between experiences when they are constituents of
37the same consciousness." By the "same consciousness" Ayer means the 
person well enough j but wwhich person is a pragmatic posit of no substan-
without implying that they have owners." ?
This means that the existence of person is made to consist only
&  Ibid.. p.22U
36
Ibid., p.22h
37 2*2* > P*226
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tial unity whatsoever.
That there seems to be an "unobservable somewhat" underlying sen­
sations as the result of such reference terms as "self" and "personal 
identity" is for Ayer an assumption he wishes to dispel. It is no more
H O
significant than the falsely assumed entities underlying material things. 
And we have seen his linguistic solution for material things. Consequently, 
all reference to the self and to personal identity is simply a way of say­
ing something about sense-experiences.39
This explanation of the meaning Ayer gives to substance and ego 
provides us with an intimate view of the basic empiricist postulates in 
his doctrine, together with their philosophic consequences. We are now in 
a position to‘ understand the formulation of the criterion by which we can 
know when a statement describes a matter of fact. We have seen his 
notion of the fundamental role of language and of his sense-data world 
which it describes. The problem which follows upon these fundamentals is 
a vast one. To know what Ayer means by sense-data and language are differ­
ent matters entirely from knowing in each particular instance when a state­
ment describes a fact. This latter is a case for verification, whereas 
sense-data and language, in keeping with his doctrine, are not, since they 
are the given.
3® Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.126
39 Ibid., p.128
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By formulating a criterion for testing a genuine proposition Ayer
claims that, through it, we will be able to know when a statement describes
a matter of fact, and when it does not. He speaks of the criterion as the
1*0
principle of verification. In brief, the principle declares that the 
meaning of a statement is determined by the way in which it can be veri­
fied. The verification consists in the statement being tested by empirical 
kl
observation. The whole intention in Ayer*s mind is to find out when an 
empirical statement is literally significant. He holds it to be so when it 
is factually meaningful. That is to say, a statement may be said to de­
scribe a matter of fact when it expresses some empirical observation. "The 
meaning of a sentence, we may say," remarks Ayer, "is an empirical fact.
And we may explain that we give the name "empirical fact" to whatever can
1*2
be factually observed." The ultimate basis for validity is sense-data 
experience, since according to him, ". • . it is through having some exper­
ience that we discover the truth or falsehood of any statement of empirical 
fact." ^
It may seem that this statement of the criterion may just as readi­
ly have been given without so much concern over the fundamentals upon which 
it is based. However, we have had the advantage of understanding how the 
criterion develops from the basic "given", and consequently we are able to
Ayer, "Bie Vienna Circle", The Revolution in Philosophy, p. 71*
1*2
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.95
1*3
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.17
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appreciate better why Ayer makes his criterion to be the rule for limiting 
knowledge. We may apply here a remark Ayer himself uses on this same point, 
that such an answer could just as well have been given at the outset without 
having to take the trouble of explaining so much. But he argues that the 
important thing is not so much the formulation of the criterion as the analy­
sis required to make the way clear for its acceptance. ^
^  P*ll$
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IV
THE PROBLEM OF INDUBITABLE PROPOSITIONS
We have seen now what Ayer considers a matter of fact to be, and 
that he holds a statement describes a matter of fact when, through a 
linguistic convention, it imparts factual information about sense-experi- 
ence. Any proposition so expressed by a sentence is verified simply by 
our knowing the observation. In order to verify a factual proposition 
all one has to know is what observation would lead him to accept it as 
being true, or reject it as false. This is the statement of the criter­
ion in principle, but it is not the most precise statement of it since it 
does not explain all the difficulties involved in verification. Ayer 
finds it necessary to add refinements and amplifications to it. This is 
necessary Since he domes to realize that knowing what observation would 
lead him to accept or reject a proposition as being true is not easily 
determined in fact. For one thing, there can be errors in factual state­
ments. Consequently,Ayer is obliged to posit certain conditions that will 
assist him to verify.
These certain conditions are two in number; first, to allow for 
both practical verifiability and verifiability in principle; and second, 
to take into consideration the vagueness of both sense-data and ''physical 
object" statements. With respect to the first condition, Ayer places
•I
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.35
Uo
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great store on his distinction between practical verifiability and verifi­
ability in principle. It lends considerable liberality to his criterion. 
Both are admissible, and any one of them satisfies where applicable. Thus, 
he holds that there are any number of propositions, like "arsenic is poison­
ous", which we never in fact verify, but readily accept as true since the 
practical means of verifying them are available if we want to take the 
trouble, - for we know what observations do verify them, since they are 
more or less accessible. On the other hand, factual propositions, like 
"there are mountains on the far side of the moon", lack the practical means
of verification, yet they are verifiable in principle - since we know what
2observations would verify them, were they accessible to us.
Regarding the second point, the "vagueness" referred to is the de­
gree of vagueness of most empirical propositions to which the criterion
3
must be adaptable. This vagueness is due to the inability of the more 
accepted rules of language to designate all that is involved in the sense- 
data which they describe. In "physical object" language we describe sense- 
data as material things, and in this Ayer sees a definite vagueness. Such 
statements are vague because "physical object" language does not describe 
all that can be said of a particular sense-datum. Furthermore, there is an 
additional vagueness since "physical object" statements are illusive in 
their indirect reference to sense-data. Statements expressed in sense-data
 ^Ibid., p.36 
3
Ibid., p.12
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terminology are also vague because the complete list of the terms of 
sense-data language would be most difficult to compile in practice, since 
they would have to be as varied as the sensible characteristics they at­
tempt to describe - a most difficult task owing to the infinite series of
ksense-experiences with which one can become acquainted.
Ayer's frequent preoccupation with the comparative merits of these 
two linguistic uses during the years he was developing his position was with 
a view, not only to bring the vagueness of statements of material things clo­
ser to experience through having an alternative way of describing those 
experiences with more precision - through sense-data terminology - but also 
he had hopes of establishing the verification of statements of material 
things by means of sense-data propositions. While it is true both languages 
are prescriptive, he observed that sense-data language was logically prior 
since its reference was more direct, and thus could serve as the basis for 
the verification of all empirical statements - especially statements of 
material things. He entertained these hopes even though he agreed that
there was not a mutual entailment between sense-data statements and those of
6material things.
Coming now to the final complete understanding of the principle of 
verification, we must note three important stages of Ayer’s development. In
^ Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.lk6, and The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge, pp. 238-239
£
' Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.109 ff.
6 Ibid., pp. 238-239
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the first stage the question which he originally put to himself was;
"Would any observation be relevant to the determination of a putative
7
statement being true or false?" It is well to observe Ayer does not 
say "does sc«ne precise observation determine it?", but "would any obser­
vation determine it?" There will be many cases, observes Ayer, where a 
precise observation will not be available. In fact, the majority of state-
O
ments which people make do not refer to personal actual observations. On
the other hand, there are some propositions where they are available. Such
are those propositions which record an actual or possible observation and
9
which he refers to as experiential propositions. Since they are simply
recordings of these experiences then they designate the experiences direct-
10
ly, that is, in sense-data terms. Ayer appeals to these experiential
propositions as the basis for the verification of all other empirical state
ments. He laid it down that any statement from which an experiential propo
sition could be deduced is a genuine factual proposition.^ The basis for
this kind of verification originates from the empiricists’ premise that to
refer to sense-data is not necessarily a way of referring to "physical
objects", whereas, referring to "physical objects" is necessarily a way of
12
referring to sense-data.
7 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.38
8 Ibid., p.ll
9
Ibid., p.38
10 . ,
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.lqo
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.38
12 Ayer, Philosophical. Essays, p. 10U
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In using the term "deduced” Ayer in no way means it to be taken 
in the sense of proceeding from a principle to a conclusion, but that from 
a statement about a material thing there can be found a statement of sense- 
data, - that is, in sense-data language, - corresponding to the statement 
of a "physical object" either in whole, or in part. This does not mean 
that the terms of any "physical object" statement can be mutually trans­
latable into sense-data language, for, as we saw, Ayer holds that there can 
be no mutual entailment between them. This holds even where the "physical 
object" statement refers to an actually occurring experience. There is a 
correspondence between a "physical object" statement and a sense-data state­
ment only in that they both refer to the same experience. And in such a 
case they are not identical statements, and neither of them describes any 
more of the experience than the other. As well as speaking of "deducing an 
experiential statement" from any other statement of empirical fact, he also 
refers to the same procedure in its reverse form of "reducing" material 
things to sense-data. ^
The aim of the criterion is to find a statement in sense-data lan­
guage which designates the same experience, or part of it, that a "physical 
object" statement designates. When this is done then the "physical object" 
is said to entail an experiential proposition, - to which the "physical 
object" statement is "reduced", or, in other words, an experiential propo­
sition can be deduced from a "physical object" statement being tested. The 
experiential statement is verified directly, and the "physical object"
13 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.6U
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statement from which the same experiential proposition is deduced, is 
verified indirectly. ^  Ayer shows the procedure of this reduction pro­
cess in the course of qualifying his answer to the question of how it is 
to be determined that an empirical proposition corresponds to a fact. He 
replies that, in the last resort, it is always a case of the actual obser­
vation to which it refers. Such a demand, as he sees it, calls for direct 
verification of the proposition with the facts by means of a language whose 
symbols are precisely determined by the rule that correlates them with the 
sense-data in question. "Such precision", he asserts, "is not attainable 
in the case of a sentence which refers to material things." ^  In this 
matter of finally coming to the actual observation, Ayer observes:
I say "in the last resort" because it is necessary here to
draw a distinction between propositions the truth of which is deter­
mined directly by observation, and those that are verified indirectly. 
One's grounds for believing a given proposition is often, in the first 
instance, the truth of a second proposition which is evidence for it; 
and one’s grounds for believing the second proposition may, in its
turn, be the truth of a third; but this series cannot be prolonged
indefinitely. In the end it must include at least one proposition
that is believed, not merely on the grounds that it is supported by
other propositions, but in virtue of what is actually observed. For, 
as I have already shown, we are not entitled to regard a set of pro­
positions as true merely because they support one another. In order 
that we should have reason to accept any of them, it is necessary
that at least one of their number should be directly verified by ob­
servation of an empirical fact.
The class of propositions capable of direct verification dependsupon the
^ "Let us call a proposition which records an actual or possible 
observation an experiential proposition. Then we may say that it is the 
mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that it should be equivalent to 
an experiential proposition, or any finite number of propositions, but 
simply that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in con­
junction with certain other premises without being deducible from those 
other premises alone." Ibid., pp. 38-39
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.110
16
Ibid., pp.108-109
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language chosen to express them. Ayer held that such propositions as 
"this is a match-box" are not directly verifiable, and that the meaning 
of such propositions can be determined only by reference to sentences 
which designate sense-data, for "it is only when a sentence explicitly 
designates a sense-datum that its meaning is determined by reference to 
fact". 17
Fran the days when he first took up the task of developing his 
criterion by reviewing the conditions to which it must conform, Ayer has 
been troubled with whether or not these basic experiential propositions 
to which others are reduced are absolutely indubitable, and, as such, 
incorrigible. To be able to say "yes" would be highly desirable, since
18
they would "form the completely valid basis of all empirical knowledge."
In this first period Ayer was looking for indubitable propositions, and
concluded that there were none. At first he was committed entirely to the
view that no proposition could be conclusively verified, not even the exper- 
19iential ones. He maintained that in virtue of the fact that a subsequent
experience may call in doubt a proposition of a previous experience, thus
lending to an infinite series of acts of verification, there are, consequent-
20ly, no final propositions.
17 Ibid., p.110
18 Alfred J. Ayer, "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis, (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 193$), Vol.Ill, No.l, pub. in Philosophy and Analysis,
(New York: Philosophical Library, 19$h) ed., Margaret MacDonald, p.237 ff•
19 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp.37-38 and 93-9h
20
Ibid., p.9U
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In his second stage Ayer comes to the view that there were propo-
21sitions which could have conclusive verification. He saw that among 
empirical propositions there was a class which were not continually sub­
ject to the test of further experience, hence, they must be more than 
accepted hypotheses. In fact, as he now saw them, they were such that no 
subsequent experience could possibly confute them. Such propositions 
were those which solely record the content of a single present experience. 
Their conclusive verification is the occurrence of the experience to which
pp
they uniquely refer. He called these "basic propositions”. He held
it to be characteristic of such a proposition that it be completely veri­
fied by the existence of the sense-datum which it describes; to doubt the
truth of such a proposition would be meaningless since it is only signifi-
23
cant to doubt where there is a logical possibility of error. To the
extent that one could not be mistaken about these basic propositions,
formed directly in the mere recordings of present experiences, Ayer held
2k
them to be "incorrigible”.
During this time Ayer felt one could not be factually mistaken in
21 Ibid., p.10
22
Ibid., p.10
23
Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p.83
"Furthermore, I should now agree with those who say that pro­
positions of this kind are "incorrigible” assuming that what is meant by 
being incorrigible is that it is impossible to be mistaken about them 
except in a verbal sense." Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.10
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the mere recording of these propositions, but only in the verbal misdescrip­
tion of them. He argues that if one uses a sentence like "this is green"
to designate a present sense-datum, then such a proposition asserts a truth
2$
of which no further evidence would be relevant. In such a case where one 
doubts whether "this is green", it is simply that one doubts whether green 
is the correct word to use.
In this second stage Ayer sees that his original experiential pro­
positions divide into basic propositions and what he terms observation- 
statements. The latter are those which record an actual or possible exper­
ience, as distinct from the unique actual occurrence proper to the basic 
propositions. Ayer found this division necessary because basic statements,ow­
ing to their complete independence, provide no possibility of being a means
26
of verification for factual statements. Thus Ayer changed his original
statement of the criterion to centre around observation-statements. It
made the reduction of factual statements to observation-statements an elabor- 
27
ate process, which, as we shall see, no longer applies as a result of the
^ "In a verbal sense, indeed, it is always possible to mis­
describe one's experience; but if one intends to do no more than record 
what is experienced without relating it to anything else, it is not 
possible to be factually mistaken, and the reason for this is that one 
is making no claim that any further fact could confute." Ibid., p.10
26 Ibid., p.10
27 "I propose to say that a statement is directly verifiable if 
it is either itself an observation-statement, or Is such that in con­
junction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one 
observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises 
alone; and I propose to say that a statement is indirectly verifiable 
if it satisfies the following conditions: first, that in conjunction
with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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position he adopted in the third stage of his development regarding incor­
rigible propositions.
A third and final stage of development is reached where Ayer comes
to hold that it is quite possible to be factually mistaken as well, and
20not just verbally. Constant evidence of misdescription with the repeat­
ed chances of delusion,^ and illusion3® being among them, led him finally 
to contend "that there are some cases in which it is more plausible to say 
that the mistake is factual." 3^ Ayer concluded that there is a possibil­
ity of being in doubt since there can obviously be a difference between
32
the way a thing looks and the way one judges it to look. And from this 
he notes that "there is then no class of descriptive statements which are 
incorrigible." ^
In view of the foregoing conclusion, where does the process of
statements which are not deducible from these other premises alonej 
and secondly, that these other premises do not include any statement 
that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of 
being independently established as directly verifiable. And I can 
now reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a liter­
ally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be 
either directly or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense."
Ibid., p.13
28 Ayer, Philosophical Essays, p.ll6
29
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.38
30 Ibid., p.69
31
Ibid., p.70
32
Ibid., pp.69-70
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verification terminate? Whether one has misdescribed one’s experience or 
not, cannot be completely determined in principle. Ayer grants this, but 
he is reluctant to surrender to scepticism entirely on the matter. So he 
states that the verification terminates in someone’s having some experi- 
ence and in accepting the truth of some statement which describes it.
The danger here is, as Ayer admits, that an experience will be taken as 
verified when it is not. This, means in any particular case one can have 
no way of knowing whether one has made a mistake or not made a mistake. One 
never knows in any one instance when one has misdescribed an experience, 
since one may never go back to recheck what is no longer occurring.
Ayer does not consider this fallibility of statements any threat to 
our knowledge. He insists that this fallibility ought not to be taken to 
mean that we can never verify anything. He has always assumed that a prag-
35matic motive is necessary in accepting the validity of our knowledge. He 
asserts ’’that there is no reason to doubt that the vast majority of our 
experiences are taken by us to be what they are,* in which case they verify
3h "However strong the experiential basis on which a descriptive 
statement is put forward, the possibility of its falsehood is not ex­
cluded. Statements which do no more than describe the content of a 
momentary, private experience, achieve the greatest security because 
they run the smallest risk. But they run some risk, however small, and 
because of this they too can come to grief.
We are left still with the argument that some statements must be 
incorrigible, if any are ever to be verified. If the statements which 
have been taken as basic are fallible like all the rest, where does the 
process of verification terminate? The answer is that it terminates in 
someone’s having some experience, and in accepting the truth of seme 
statement which describes it, or, more commonly, the truth of some more 
far-reaching statement which the occurrence of the experience supports. 
There is nothing fallible about the experience itself. What may be 
wrong is only one’s identification of it. If an experience has been mis- 
identified, one will be misled into thinking that some statement has been 
verified when it is not." Ibid., p.71
35 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.914-
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the statements which are construed as describing them.11 In practice we
accept their truth, and this is their verification. According to Ayer this
is adequate, and no stronger verification is necessary. Least of all is a
logical guarantee of a statement’s infallibility necessary. It can never
be logically impossible that one should take a statement to be true when it
is false. A legical guarantee would be one that preserved a statement from
contradiction by a future experience. Such a guarantee, demanded by the
37Sceptics, is, in Ayer’s opinion, a philosophical ideal.
Thus Ayer’s ultimate stand on the conclusive verification of basic 
propositions is that it is not possible to know in any given case whether we 
are mistaken in our description of an experience, or not, - nor is it neces­
sary to have such a guarantee. He argues that, for the sceptic to say that 
one’s making a statement about an experience is consistent with its being 
false, is no reason for saying that we cannot justify any statements. Ayer
<3^
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.71
^  Ibid., p.72. It would be interesting to note that Ayer
Maintains the only statement enjoying complete security from doubt is 
"I exist”. (The Problem of Knowledge, p.71)- It is not a descriptive pro­
position for him, but simply demonstrative, and as such adds nothing to 
factual knowledge, - since it is one no experience can alter. He analyzes 
the Cartesian principle Cogito, ergo sum, and objects to Descartes'view 
that, whatever else he may be able to doubt he could not doubt that he 
was thinking and, consequently, by logical necessity, that he was exist­
ing as well. For Ayer the proposition Cogito, ergo sum is an analytic 
proposition. He maintains that its only necessity is that which belongs 
to the formal logic of the language used. Thus it may be said to be in­
dubitable only to the extent that all propositions of formal logic are 
equally indubitable within their logical pattern. But this does not make 
the proposition Cogito, ergo sum necessarily indubitable, for in as much 
as one can make a mistake in logic it is not indubitable. Ayer agrees 
that a proposition in logic is necessarily true if it is true at all, 
but any necessary proposition, with regard to any given person in the 
moment of his asserting it, is an empirical proposition and not one of 
logical necessity, - since the assertion of it is an empirical fact. It
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contends that if such statements function as part of a theory which
accounts for our experiences, it must be possible for those statements to
38
justify the theory. The theory is that knowledge is had by our formu­
lating statements of appropriate experiences which count for their truth, 
according to standard usage of language. And hence, there is no practical 
reason to doubt that such statements are verified, once it is agreed to 
use the theory this way. In other words, while we can never in any one 
particular case be sure of certain verification, it is, nonetheless, the 
pragmatic thing to accept that it is verified.
This is what the criterion has come to. Thus, "physical object" 
language does not require its justification in terms of sense-data lang­
uage but, rather, it is justified by the appropriate experience which it
describes, together with the acceptance of "physical object" language as
39a way of describing that experience.
is Ayer * s conviction that in any given case a guarantee against any 
logical error is only had, to use Ayer’s own words, "if I allow some­
thing to count as a guarantee." (Ayer, "Cogito, Ergo Sum", Analysis, 
Vol.lii, No.2, Dec.,19!?3, p.28.) And the guarantee which he allows” 
himself in the proposition "I exist", in order to forestall its possi­
bility of doubt, is to resolve never to assert cogito on any occasion 
when he is not jr spared to assert sum.
38
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. lU8
39 Ibid., pp. 1UU-1U8.
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THE AIM AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY
The final statement of Ayer’s criterion is, as we have seen, that 
a proposition is verified by the appropriate experience to which it refers, 
and provided that the linguistic theory which describes it is acceptable.
In Ayer's view this criterion disposes of metaphysics. The deposition of 
metaphysics was, as we saw in chapter I, the first step Ayer took in pre­
paring the way to bring aim and method into philosophical enquiry. He 
claims that the criterion shows that there are no such valid propositions 
as those sentences uttering metaphysical nonsense of "a supra-sensible 
reality" pretend to describe. This conclusion is based on the assumption 
that factual propositions are empirical propositions only, the sole func­
tion of which is to describe actual and possible sense-experience. If a 
statement cannot stand up to the test of the criterion, then it is not an 
empirical proposition, and consequently has no factual content. Ayer's 
understanding of a metaphysical sentence is one that purports to express 
a genuine factual proposition. In terms of the criterion, no metaphysical 
sentence expresses a factual proposition since only empirical propositions 
are factual. The only other possibility of validity would be for a meta­
physical sentence to be an "a priori” proposition, that is, a tautology. 1 
But metaphysical sentences cannot be ”a priori” propositions, since such
1 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.136
53
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propositions are analytic. Analytic propositions, according to Ayer, share 
with synthetic, that is, empirical, propositions the entire class of proposi­
tions that are literally significant. Whereas an empirical proposition is 
literally significant provided that it has factual content, an analytic pro­
position, on the other hand, is significant provided that the definition of 
the symbols contained in it make it valid. That is to say, as long as the 
symbol employed in the predicate of the proposition does not add anything to
2
the symbol of the subject, not already contained in the subject, it is valid.
The predicate of an empirical proposition does add factual content to the
subject. The analytic proposition is independent of experience. That is to
say, it is in no way factual, and so can in no way be confuted by experience.
It is for this reason that they are called, by Ayer, tautologies. He argues
that they make no contribution to our knowledge for the very reason that they 
3
are not factual. Metaphysical sentences cannot be analytic propositions 
since, by the very reason that they purport to be factual, they claim to be 
synthetic. Such synthetic propositions are those which hold for the exist­
ence of a supra-sensible world. Ayer insists, on the strength of this arga­
liment, that he is entitled to deny all that metaphysical sentences express.
Since no other synthetic sentences can be literally significant than
those expressing empirical facts, there can be no such thing, Ayer asserts, 
as a body of propositions making up a science of philosophy. Whatever Ayer
2 Ibid., p.l6
3 Ibid*, PP.78-79 
k Ibid., pp.l3U-135>
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is to consider philosophy to he, he will not hold it to be philosophy of 
any kind. His reason for this is that, as he sees it, knowledge is proper 
to factual propositions. ’It is science”, he asserts, "that gives us our 
knowledge of the worldj there is not, there cannot be, a philosophical 
brand of knowledge which would compete with science in this field.” ^ Ayer 
considers his expose of metaphysics has rid us of the notion that there are 
such things as principles of philosophy upon which a doctrinal subject mat­
ter could be built through deductive reasoning.^
The only principles available to us, in Ayer’s opinion, are those 
hypothetical "laws of nature" based on experience. They belong to those 
"physical object” descriptions of scientific observations. Since they per­
tain to experience, the method by which they are arrived at is inductive, -
a method proper to science only. This, Ayer observes, is a method that
7
has never been used by the system builders of philosophy. That is, he
claims, they have never used inductive generalizations for philosophical
premises. Such inductive generalizations belong to the province of science
and philosophers have nothing to do with them, except "record the facts of
8scientific procedure."
Ayer insists further that, not only can philosophers not build a 
system on inductive hypotheses, but also, they may not deduce anything from
^ Ayer, "The Vienna Circle", The Revolution in Philosophy, p.78
^ Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.U6
^ ibid., p.1+8 
8
Ibid., p.98
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what is immediately given in experience, - such as to attempt to infer from 
appearances that there is an underlying substance, or being.^ This cannot
10
be done since, according to Ayer's principles, appearances are unanalysable. 
Thus the only other source that one could fall back upon for principles 
upon which to establish a philosophical system would be "a priori" proposi­
tions. Mere also Ayer forestalls the possibility on the ground that no 
"a priori" proposition can be the basis, or the principle, of a factual 
proposition. "It would be absurd", he says, "to put forward a system of 
tautologies as constituting the whole truth about the universe."
Ayer sees the tendency for philosophers to seek principles and thus 
to build up systems accountable to their desire to have a knowledge of real­
ity as a whole, in contrast to the distinct and separate fields of know­
ledge given to us by the different sciences. He holds this tendency to be 
nothing but a misdirection since all the sciences taken together adequately 
satisfy for the whole knowledge of "reality": "There is no field of experi­
ence which cannot, in principle, be brought under some form of scientific
law, and no type of speculative knowledge about the world which it is, in
12
principle, beyond the power of science to give."
Since, for Ayer, philosophy has no principles and no subject-matter, 
what then does he leave to it? Whether we have red. ized it or not, we have
9 Ibid., P-U3
10
11
Ibid., p.it?
Ibid., p.If7
12
Ibid., p.U8
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already experienced Ayer’s philosophical aim and method at work in these 
five areas of his philosophical position under investigation. The analysis 
of the criterion of verifiability is an instance of the office it performs. 
The resultant overthrow of metaphysics is another function, although nega­
tive. The whole analysis of sense-data with their different kinds of lin­
guistic description, - direct and indirect, with their comparative merits 
for the purpose of verification, - is a further case of philosophy's role. 
The illustration of what he conceives to be the solution of such problems 
as ’’substance” and the ”ego”, are yet other instances. All these are 
functions of philosophy, which are functions of logical analysis.
Following upon the knowledge accruing to us through science and com­
mon- sense, there is another task to be performed with regard to this know­
ledge. Knowledge, according to the logical positivists, requires critical 
analysis. To have knowledge is one thing; to interpret the significance of 
the use we make of it in description is another. Thus, for instance, the 
scientist does not, as scientist, analyse the full implications or meaning 
of a hypothesis, as far as the relationship obtaining between sense-data 
and the way in which he has preferred to express himself is concerned. In 
the case where a scientist uses "physical object” language it is the func­
tion of philosophy to make clear that, when the scientist describes the 
sense-data he is observing, he is not actually observing "physical objects” 
but merely that he is using a conventional way of describing sense-data. 
Philosophy’s function, then, is to tell us that, while we "believe” in the 
existence of "physical objects", they do not exist at all. It assures us 
also, says Ayer, that such "beliefs” are not an invalid reference as long
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as it continues to be "belief" only, and it is not to be erroneously taken 
that what one "believes" in is what really appears, necessarily. Philosophy 
shows the scientist and common-sense observer that they are in fact simply 
using an acceptable way of referring to sense-data. By "physical object" 
language we "assume" that the symbols used refer to existent "things". In 
fact, the common-sense observer is hardly ever critical of the signifi­
cance of that assumption. It is Ayer’s contention that it is philosophy’s
13role to protect us from error regarding the assumption.
It must be observed, however, that although such a function is 
assigned to philosophy by Ayer, he insists that philosophy has nothing 
whatever to do with validating scientific hypotheses, nor the facts of 
common-sense observation. Scientific hypotheses and coramon-sense observa­
tions are both prior to the office of philosophy and independent of it.
That is to say, a philosopher cannot tell a scientist what he has observed 
in sense-data, or what he should have observed. Philosophy simply scrutin­
izes the self-consistency of one's "beliefs". The philosopher aims to pre­
vent the scientist from erroneously converting what is proper only to the 
inner consistency of the language used into an order of factual "existents".
It is not within the province of philosophy to justify directly the 
"belief" of a proposition. Every man is free to know the evidence of his 
propositions, and whether he wishes to doubt or accept them. The philosoph­
er cannot dictate to him on these matters. The philosopher is indeed con-
13 Ibid., p.$9
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cerned with empirical facts, but not directly concerned. lor is the 
philosopher directly concerned with the way the facts are described. He 
cannot, for example, tell the scientist how he should have described the 
facts he observed, nor can he prescribe the language to be used. It is 
open to anyone to describe as he likes as long as he uses his symbols con­
sistently with the formal rules of the language selected. Both the facts 
and the symbols precede philosophy. The philosopher's concern with these 
two factors is always indirect in as much as he shows us what we are doing
15when we speak about things. All this is simply the logical analysis of 
language.
There is nothing factual, in Ayer*s opinion, about philosophical
propositions, in the way scientific and common-sense propositions are. No
further scientific knowledge is required by philosophy in order for it to
16
decide on what is already available to it from science and common sense.
Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.l
l£
"For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned 
with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way 
we speak about them." Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.57
"It is no further scientific information that is needed to de­
cide such philosophical questions as to whether the material world is real, 
whether objects continue to exist at times when they are not perceived, 
whether other human beings are conscious in the same sense as one is one­
self. These are not questions that can be settled by experiment since the 
way in which they are answered itself determines how the result of any 
experiment is to be interpreted. INhat is in dispute in such cases is not 
whether, in a given set of circumstances, this or that event will happen, 
but rather how anything at all that happens is to be described." Ayer,
The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 1-2
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Nor do the results of philosophical analysis add anything factual to 
what is already known by science and common sense. 'What, then, are philo­
sophical propositions?, one may ask. To which Ayer replies, they are sim-
17
ply definitions and as such belong to the department of logic. These 
definitions are not definitions of natures, since, to Ayer, there are no 
such things, but merely, what he terms definitions in use. Thus, for in­
stance, the definition of "substance", as we saw, is a definition in use.
Philosophy merely shows us how a symbol in a statement is used, - this use
3.8
is its only definition. To show how a symbol is used, or to give its 
definition, is simply to analyse the meaning of the symbol as used in a 
sentence. Philosophical propositions are analytic.
This is the aim and method of philosophy. It is not doctrinal,
19but functional. Its role is not to discover truth, but to solve puzzles.
For Ayer, philosophy’s role is first to act as a sort of intellectual
policeman, seeing that nobody trespasses into metaphysics, secondly, to
analyse and clarify the concepts which figure in the common-sense and
20scientific use of language, and chiefly the latter.
", . , the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but 
linguistic in character, - that is, they do not describe the behaviour 
of physical, or even mental objects. They express definitions, or the 
formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly, we may say that philo­
sophy is a department of logic." Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic,-p.$7
1 A Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.2
19
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p.26, note 2.
20
Ayer, "The Vienna Circle", The Revolution in Philosophy, p.79
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This means, for him, that philosophy's function is so merged with 
science itself that it would be misleading to draw a sharp distinction 
between philosophy and s cience. It would be more correct, from Ayer's 
point of view, to look upon science as having two aspects, one speculative 
and the other logical. The aspect of formulating scientific hypotheses is 
the speculative; and the aspect of showing the relation of these hypo­
theses to sense-data, together with the defining of symbols used in the 
hypotheses, is the logical. This latter, of course, is the role of logical 
analysis. In a strong expression of non-difference Ayer states that it is
of no importance what the analyst is called, whether it be philosopher, or 
21
scientist.
21
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 1E>3
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CONCLUSION
We have seen that Alfred J. Ayer’s philosophical position is a com­
posite of five major interrelated points. It has been observed, in the 
first place, that metaphysical statements are held by him to be nonsensical. 
His reason for considering them such is that, for him, knowledge is limited 
linguistically to empirical, statements. His empirical postulates demand 
that factual statements can validly express only the facts of sense-experi- 
ence. Secondly, we have considered what these empiricist postulates are 
for Ayer. The most basic "given” for Ayer is sense-data. A sense-datum is 
that of which one is directly and immediately aware. It is a simple occur­
rence in a sense-field, non-referential and non-intentional. It is in no 
way objective, in the realist sense, and it is unanalysable. This means 
that a sense-datum is productive of nothing. Left to itself, it is not 
knowledge. Sense-data must be described. Their description, as we have 
seen, is the result of Ayer’s second postulate, namely, language.
Language was the third area of this investigation. The elements of 
language are symbols which unite with one another according to fixed inter­
nal rules of formal logic in expressing propositions about sense-data. There 
is no intrinsic relation between symbols and sense-data. The relation is 
simply one of convention. Symbols are merely logical constructions convent­
ionally constituted out of sense-data. lie have seen how "physical object” 
language is one made up of logical constructions out of sense-data which
62
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describe sense-data after the manner of material things existing in reality. 
Our analyses of the terms "substance" and ''ego" were exemplifications of 
how "physical object" language describes sense-data.
It was by treating these two postulates, sense-data and language, 
that we were able to show what Ayer considers a matter of fact to be, and 
when he considers a statement describes a matter of fact. The next point 
for consideration which followed upon this was: How is it known in any par­
ticular instance that a statement does describe a matter of fact correctly?
- that is, the problem of accepting or rejecting a statement as true or 
false. Three stages in Ayer's development were pointed out on this matter; 
first, his original position of holding all knowledge to be no more than 
propositions of empirical hypotheses; second, his holding for conclusive 
verification of basic propositions, and of establishing observation-state­
ments of actual and possible experience, through which all other empirical 
propositions could be verified; and finally, where he concluded that there 
are no indubitable propositions of any kind. This was based on the fact that 
one judges a thing to appear other than it does actually appear. He contends 
that in any given instance we can never be sure, in principle, that a propo­
sition egresses a sens e-datum. But, he holds that it is the practical thing 
to accept that it does.
As a result of this three-stage analysis of indubitable propo­
sitions, Ayer's final stand on the matter is that a proposition is veri­
fied by the appropriate experience which it describes. For it is that 
experience which accounts for the truth of the proposition; provided, 
of course, that the language used is able to describe the experience
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adequately.
With this final point cleared up, we were able to show what Ayer 
holds to be the aim and method of philosophy. The method is one of analy­
sis. The first step in the procedure is to accept for analysis only those 
propositions expressing empirical facts, and of which there is no practical 
doubt of their certitude. The second step is to classify language and to 
show how it is used in describing sense-data, both in its everyday use and 
in scientific statements. This is the role of philosophy. It is not fact­
ual knowledge, or doctrinal in any way, but simply functional. Ayer con­
ceives of this functional role as a logic of definitions.
Having thus established what he considers to be the aim and method 
of philosophy, Ayer is confident that fidelity to this aim and method will 
guarantee the elimination of metaphysical quarrels and the achievement of 
the desired unity in philosophy.
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